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The Myth of Pelagianism is a systematic reinterpretation of Pelagius’ role in the development 
of Christian doctrine. Its central argument may be summarised as follows.1 Pelagius’ 
understanding of the relationship between divine grace and the human will is 
indistinguishable from Christian orthodoxy, such as it was defined and understood up to the 
time of St. Augustine. However, Augustine succeeded in misrepresenting Pelagius’ teaching 
as innovative (i.e. heretical), and in passing his own heretical innovations off as orthodoxy 
[pp. 26–8, 195–6, 217, 263, 270–2, 285–7], thus fundamentally compromising Christian 
reflection on human psychology until the Renaissance, and the recovery of Classical 
literature that served as its basis [p. 306–7]. In this, Bonner’s ground-breaking argument 
about Pelagius and Augustine is, paradoxically, also an argument to return to a very 
traditional (and largely discredited) historiography. Late Antiquity is again to be 
characterised by a loss of rational freedom2 that is taken to be recovered only on the other 
side of a comparatively dark and ignorant Middle Ages,3 but with the important difference 
that now it is the triumph of Augustine over Pelagius that is presented as the primary 
evidence for these conclusions. Bonner’s lack of reference to current scholarly interpretations 
of intellectual history when expounding her own [e.g. pp. 301–7] suggests that the traditional 
interpretation of history that she affirms is either assumed by her argument, as its unexamined 
basis, or that it was deemed to be an inescapable conclusion on the strength of her 
reevaluation of Pelagius alone. The former would, of course, be a serious weakness, the 
latter, if successful, a great and somewhat audacious achievement. Any definite conclusions 
must here wait upon the analysis of the structure of her argument which now follows. 
Although, if Bonner took this to be the necessary conclusion of her study of this one figure, 
in full knowledge of the boldness of this claim, it is certainly strange that recent scholarship 
would not be mentioned, at least for the sake of showing it to be wrong. 
     The foundation of her reinterpretation of Pelagius is her case for a minimalist position on 
the extent of his corpus. Her grounds for including only four letters,4 the Statement of Faith,5 
and, notably, not the Expositions of the Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul6 are given in the 
introduction [pp. xvii–xviii; see also 237].  The grounds offered are, however, surprisingly 
sparse. We are assured that the attribution of these five works to Pelagius is incontestable, but 
not what makes them so. One would be forgiven for assuming that this must then reflect an 
 
1 My thanks to Liam Breatnach (DIAS), Nike Stam (DIAS), and especially, to Evan King (UCD), whose 
thoughtful editorial suggestions have done much to improve the expression of this review. My thanks also to Dr. 
Duncan Sneddon (Church of Scotland) for recommending James Hogg’s The Private Memoirs and Confessions 
of a Justified Sinner to me. 
2 For an important example, see E.R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety (Cambridge 1965). 
3 For a good overview of the historical development of such an understanding of the Middle Ages, and its 
pitfalls, see Alessandra Petrina, ‘All Petrarch’s Fault: The Idea of a Renaissance’, Memoria di Shakespeare: A 
Journal of Shakespearean Studies 6 (2019), 145–64. 
4 i.e. Letter to Demetrias (Ad Demetriadem), On virginity (De virginitate), On the Divine Law (De diuina lega) 
and Letter to Celantia (Ad Celantiam). The respective translations of these are found in B.R. Rees, tr., Pelagius: 
Life and Letters (Woodbridge 1988), 29–70, 71–87, 88–104, and 127–46, with references to the corresponding 
editions at 133–4. 
5 Libellus fidei; Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., Patrologia Latina, 217 vols (Paris 1841–55) XLV, col. 1716–8; 
William Wall, tr., The History of Baptism in Two Parts, 3 vols (London 1819, 4th ed.) I, 343–53. 
6 Expositiones XIII epistularum sancti Pauli. See Alexander Souter, ed., Pelagius’s Expositions of Thirteen 
Epistles of St Paul, 3 vols, Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Studies: Texts and Studies 9 (Cambridge 
1922–31). Thus far, only the section of the Expositions which interprets the Epistle to the Romans has been 
translated into English; Theodore de Bruyn, tr. Pelagius’s Commentary on St Paul’s Epistle to the Romans 
(Oxford 1993). 
unwavering scholarly consensus. But while she is far from being the only person to attribute 
these five works to Pelagius, of these, only the Letter to Demetrias and the Statement of Faith 
are listed among Pelagius’ authentic works in Lössl’s 2001 monograph on Julian of 
Aeclanum, for example.7 In a study that sets out to make an argument about Pelagius’ 
thought as a whole – a study, moreover, that is likely to attract many non-specialist readers 
who are, as such, unfamiliar with the scholarship – it is unfortunate that the implicit reasons 
for her confidence in claiming these works for Pelagius, in spite of contrary arguments,8 are 
not made available to scrutiny. That said, this omission is not as puzzling as the brief and 
summary character of the case she makes for the exclusion of the Expositions from 
consideration, seeing that the task she has set for herself is greatly simplified (and perhaps 
even made possible) by it. For insofar as this exclusion may be justified, it frees her from 
having to deal with the greater part of the material on which rival characterisations of 
Pelagius have been based. It is, after all, about five times the length of Pelagius’ entire 
corpus, as she understands it.9 Thus the conclusiveness of her findings, to a great extent, still 
remains to be seen. Their confirmation would seem to depend upon one of two future 
contingencies: 1) an argument for the absolute exclusion of the Expositions from the corpus 
of Pelagius’ works which is sufficiently comprehensive to necessitate this conclusion 
thereafter, or 2) a similarly comprehensive demonstration that the Expositions’ evidence of 
Pelagius’ thought – to the degree, and in the way that, it should be admitted – does not 
materially alter her conclusions.  
     The most immediate result of her minimalist position on the extent of Pelagius’ corpus is 
that it facilitates a similarly minimalist position on the extent of the admissible evidence 
found in Augustine. Any position which Augustine associates with Pelagius that is not found 
in the five relatively brief works which Bonner takes to be genuine, or else in the surviving 
fragments of his lost works (notably In Defence of Free Will10 and On Nature11) is, on this 
basis, interpreted as further proof of Augustine’s Machiavellian manipulation of the 
evidence.12 Her attempt to wholly discredit Augustine’s account of Pelagius’ teaching, by this 
 
7 Josef Lössl, Julian von Aeclanum: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinem Werk, seiner Lehre und ihrer 
Überlieferung (Leiden 2001), 342–3. For a brief summary of the scholarly debate regarding which letters may 
be attributed to Pelagius, and the continuing controversy concerning the attribution of The Statement of Faith, 
see Mathijs Lamberigts, ‘Pelagius and Pelagians’, in Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter, eds, The 
Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies (Oxford 2008), 258–82, at 259–62. 
8 Lamberigts, ‘Pelagius and Pelagians’, 264: ‘certitude and unanimity exist only with respect to the commentary 
on Paul, the letter to Demetrias, the Libellus fidei, and a number of fragments, including De natura and Pro 
libero arbitrio’. 
9 Souter’s edition of the text is more than five hundred pages in length. 
10 Pro libero arbitrio. A rebuttal to St. Jerome’s anti-Pelagian works. There is no complete modern edition of 
the extant fragments. The majority (i.e. ten) are found in Augustine’s On the Grace of Christ and On Original 
Sin (De gratia Christi et de peccato originali). These are collected in Migne, ed. Patrologia Latina XLIX, col. 
611–13. There is another fragment in Augustine’s Letter 186 and Sermon 156, for which, see Josef Lössl, 
‘Dating Augustine’s Sermons 151–156: Internal Evidence’, in Gert Partoens, ed., Augustinus: Sermones de 
Novo Testamento [151–56], Sermones in epistolas apostolicas I, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 41Ba 
(Turnhout 2008), xxiii–lv. Three further fragments have been transmitted under attribution to St. Jerome in MS 
lat. 653 of the Bibliothèque Nationale, see Alex Souter, ‘Another New Fragment of Pelagius’, The Journal of 
Theological Studies 12.45 (1910), 32–5. These are collected in A.-G. Hamman, ed., Patrologiae latinae 
supplementum, 5 vols (1958 –74) I, col.1539–43. Further bibliographical details are found in Anthony Dupont 
and Giulio Malavasi, ‘The Question of the Impact of Divine Grace in the Pelagian Controversy: Human posse, 
uelle et esse according to Pelagius, Jerome, and Augustine’, Revue d’Histoire Ecclésiastique 112 (2017), 539–
68, at 539. 
11 De natura. The target of Augustine’ On Nature and Grace (De natura et gratia). The extant fragments are 
collected and discussed in Winrich A. Löhr, ‘Pelagius’ Schrift De natura: Rekonstruktion und Analyse’, 
Recherches augustiniennes 31 (1999), 235–294. 
12 It is somewhat conspicuous that, of all the works of Pelagius for which fragmentary evidence remains, only In 
Defence of Free Will and On Nature are referenced or even named at any point. The lack of any reference to 
and other means (which shall be discussed in turn), is the substance of the first chapter [pp. 
1–28], but it is a recurring theme thereafter. Setting aside, for the moment, the fact that 
Bonner’s reduction of the Pelagian corpus to such a narrow scope is based on her own 
authority, rather than the careful provision of evidence, a demonstration that certain positions 
attributed to Pelagius by Augustine, were not, in fact, held by him, is certainly the right place 
for a polemic against Augustine’s trustworthiness as a source to begin. However, even had it 
been proven that the presence of later interpolations in the text of the Expositions, as it stands 
in Souter’s edition, meant that it cannot, in fact, provide any reliable evidence of Pelagius’ 
thought, this would still fall short of proof that the ideas found in it do not include his. 
Absence of unambiguous evidence is not unambiguous evidence of an absence. Or more 
precisely, uncertainty as to whether Pelagius held a position attributed to him by Augustine is 
not the same as proof that its attribution to Pelagius was manufactured by Augustine, 
especially if it also occurs in a text that is generally attributed to Pelagius. Where, for 
instance, Augustine bears witness to a doctrine also found in the Expositions, but not in the 
works that Bonner attributes to Pelagius, it might perhaps be argued that this reflects a 
subsequent Augustinianising intervention in the original text of the Expositions. Yet without 
further evidence, it will be at least as likely to indicate that Augustine was correctly informed 
on that point, or that he honestly believed himself to be so, either on the basis of familiarity 
with the Expositions itself,13 or another text he associated with Pelagius, whatever its true 
provenance might be. 
     Moreover, the Augustine whom she presents to us is something of a straw-man: being 
limited, for the most part, to an interpretation of the Augustine of On the Deeds of Pelagius,14 
which is then used as the ostensible key to the significance of relevant passages from 
Augustine’s other works, in the more incidental references which are made to them. In the 
first instance, it is unclear that any one work of Augustine’s could be taken to be 
representative of his understanding of Pelagianism, since, as Bonner herself notes,15 his 
understanding of it developed over time. A successful attempt to invalidate the whole of his 
thought on Pelagius would require a much more extensive engagement with his anti-Pelagian 
writings, and their relationship to his thought as a whole, than has been attempted here. But 
were one to select only a single text, it would surely need to be the one in which Augustine’s 
case against Pelagius is most fully realised, rather than a text like On the Deeds of Pelagius, 
which is still fairly early in the development of his anti-Pelagian polemic. Albeit, the 
preliminary nature of this text is not the primary difficulty.     
     The main problem with treating this text as broadly representative of Augustine’s position 
is its purpose. In On the Deeds of Pelagius, Augustine is not attempting to produce a 
complete account of the faults that he had found specifically in Pelagius’ own writings, but 
 
Extracts from the Divine Scriptures (Eclogarum ex divinis scripturis liber) is, for example, a notable exclusion. 
The extant fragments of this work occur in Jerome’s Dialogue in Answer to the Pelagians (Dialogus contra 
Pelagianos) and in Augustine’s On the Deeds of Pelagius (De gestis Pelagii). They are collected in Migne, ed., 
Patrologia Latina XLVIII, col. 593–6. 
13 After writing the first two books of The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins, and before writing the third, 
Augustine obtained a copy of the Expositions. The third book is Augustine’s refutation of the Expositions’ 
interpretation of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, and the marks first time he mentions Pelagius by name; see 
De peccatorum meritis et remissione et baptismo parvulorum III.i.1, as noted by Roland J. Teske, The Works of 
Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st Century: Answer to the Pelagians, 4 vols. (New York 2001–5) I, 22 
and 136 n.1. 
14 De gestis Pelagii; Charles F. Urba and Joseph Zycha, eds, Sancti Avreli Avgvstini: De perfectione ivstitiae 
hominis, De gestis Pelagii, De gratia Christi et de peccato originali libri dvo, De nvptiis et concvpiscentia ad 
valerivm comitem libri dvo, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 42 (Prague, Vienna and Leipzig 
1902), 51–122; Teske, tr., The Works of Saint Augustine I, 336–83. 
15 e.g. p. 227: ‘Augustine admitted that he was forced to redefine his ideas in the course of his opposition to 
Pelagius’. 
rather, to show that the questions put to Pelagius by the Synod of Diospolis (415) did not 
succeed in forcing him to decisively defend or deny the larger body of heretical doctrines that 
had come to be associated with him. To be sure, it concludes with a list of heresies that he 
presents as describing ‘the whole of this heresy’ (tota haeresis ista).16 But ‘this heresy’ is the 
whole body of doctrines that Augustine takes to be derived from Pelagius’ seminal 
theological errors, and, therefore, the list of its component doctrines was never intended to be 
limited to those seminal errors in themselves, as is clearly seen when he shows himself 
unwilling to pronounce on how many of the propositions of ‘this heresy’ were ever actually 
held by Pelagius, or exactly how he may have understood those propositions that he did 
hold.17 The text in which Augustine’s certainty about the past or present content of Pelagius’ 
thought – or its relationship to the doctrines anathematised by the Synod of Diospolis – is at 
its lowest ebb, will be unlikely to show us much about the ultimate validity or invalidity of 
Augustine’s understanding of Pelagius. Such disjunctions as may be found between the 
doctrines condemned by the council and the writings of Pelagius that preceded the council,18 
cannot reflect either well or badly on Augustine where he is at his most hesitant to insist upon 
their conjunction. And these disjunctions are not as many as are claimed. 
     Many of the disjunctions that Bonner identifies, between the doctrines that Augustine 
attributes to the larger body of Pelagianism, and the small corpus of writings that she takes to 
be authentically written by Pelagius, are created rather than found. At first glance, she is quite 
successful at reinterpreting most of these doctrines in a way that shows that they do not apply 
to Pelagius. But further attention reveals that she often achieves this by exploiting the 
semantic ambiguity that Augustine’s formulations have only when divorced from the larger 
context of his thought, and not taking into account (or actively setting aside)19 what 
Augustine evidently understood them to mean. A review is unfortunately not the appropriate 
occasion to deal with each relevant instance individually, and so the most important example 
must here stand for the rest.   
     It is not especially relevant that ‘grace’ (gratia) admitted many different interpretations in 
the theology of the time. Augustine’s dispute with Pelagius is not, as Bonner has it, that this 
word should only have the meaning that Augustine gave it [p. 11]. What was important to 
Augustine was that the reality described by a certain technical sense of ‘grace’ is absolutely 
necessary to the conversion of the soul, and that Pelagius seemed to think that this reality was 
non-essential, or even non-existent. In this signification, grace describes the way that God – 
however far any given person might look back in the process of their deliberation – is always 
already to be found there before, moving, persuading and instructing the soul from within, as 
the very condition, motive and goal of its potential for goodness: prevenient grace. More 
often than not, Bonner allows that Augustine’s insistence on the necessity of prevenient grace 
to the restoration of the soul – over and beyond the gracious help with which Pelagius 
believed that God always assisted a soul which did well – is not simply a struggle over what a 
word means, but a principled theological disagreement [e.g. p. 196]. So far so good. 
However, the leap she makes from there, in claiming that Pelagius’ doctrine of grace affirms 
 
16 De gestis Pelagii XXXV.65; Urba and Zycha, eds, CSEL 42, 119; Teske, tr. The Works of Augustine I, 377. 
17 De gestis Pelagii XIV.30 and XXXV.65. Quoted, in part, by Bonner on p. 23. 
18 Bonner cites fragments of In Defence of Free Will as evidence against the validity of Augustine’s 
characterisation of the findings of the council of Diospolis [pp. 12–13, 19–21]. However, this work was 
composed in the year following the council. Moreover, Augustine shows no knowledge of it until his following 
anti-Pelagian work, On the Grace of Christ and On Original Sin, as indicated in note 10 above. Therefore, it 
appears to be inadmissible as unqualified evidence for or against the portrayal of Pelagianism in On the Deeds 
of Pelagius. This principle also applies to Bonner’s use of Pelagius’ Statement of Faith for the same purpose 
[pp. 6, 13, 19]. 
19 The most important examples of her actively setting aside Augustine’s interpretation being found in her 
discussion of propositions 8 and 9 [pp. 10–18]. 
the role of free will in contrast to Augustine, seems to betray a fundamental 
misunderstanding of Augustine.  
     Of course, arguments for the doctrine of double-predestination (the idea that souls can be 
predestined to damnation as well as salvation), whether in the mouth of a Gottschalk20 or a 
Calvin,21 have tended to trace their lineage back to Augustine. But, if Bonner is correct, this 
would seem to suggest that only the most uncompromising forms of Calvinism, such as 
James Hogg satirised in The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner,22 have 
ever got Augustine right. The most basic problem with this interpretation is that Augustine is 
always talking about free will as if it were something that existed. Granted, it remains that 
Augustine is no less strong in his insistence that the soul is incapable of willing what is good 
without first being moved by God’s prevenient grace, and further, that the ethical state of 
each soul is, in some sense, predestined by God, together with its resulting rewards and 
punishments. One might well argue that these positions are incommensurable with his 
insistence on the reality of free will [p. 170 n. 209].23 However, the importance of free will as 
an Augustinian theme leaves no basis whatsoever for her claim that it is Pelagius’ affirmation 
of free will, as such, that made him a target for persecution [pp. xiv, 13, 26, 170, 260, 273, 
285–6], or that the ‘confident account of man’ that this is said to entail [pp. 100, 104–5, 108, 
142, 165, 214, 226, 236] would not be ‘publicly acceptable’ again prior to the Renaissance 
[pp. 298, 307].   
     It may be that Bonner simply concluded that Augustine’s doctrine of grace leaves no room 
for free will, whatever he might say to the contrary. There is at least one place where she says 
something like this [p. 263]. Such a concern was certainly raised (and refuted) at the Second 
Council of Orange, in 529. Nor was it raised there for the last time. But if so, such a 
conclusion cannot be maintained when Augustine’s doctrine of grace is interpreted in light of 
his doctrine of God’s eternity. The initial point to be made is that prevenient grace and 
predestination do not, as Bonner has it, amount to much the same thing for Augustine [e.g. 
pp. xii, 15–8, 20 n.59, 25, 196]. Prevenient grace, as he understands it, is not irresistible [cf. 
pp. xii, 161, 132, 224],24 but rather upholds and strengthens the deliberative power of human 
reason from within, at its very root, so that the choice of what is truly good is able to take its 
place among the possible outcomes of its deliberations.25 Although such a claim would seem 
to be entirely empty, were it to turn out that divine providence has predestined the results of 
the soul’s deliberations about good and evil courses of action in a way which undermines 
 
20 Whose arguments were the target of Eriugena’s On Divine Predestination (De divina praedestinatione). 
21 e.g. Institutes of the Christian Religion (Institutio Christianae religionis) III.21. 
22 First published anonymously in 1824. 
23 Bonner portrays St. John Cassian’s doctrine as paradoxical in the same way as she does Augustine’s here. 
However, this is unaccountably taken as evidence that he parallels Pelagius, and opposes Augustine [p. 196 n. 
298]. 
24 The whole premise of On the Perseverance of the Saints (De praedestinatione sanctorum), for example, is 
based on this affirmation that one may, for a while, act in obedience to God’s grace, but not persist in this 
obedience, or, alternatively, that such perseverance may (from the perspective of time) come to be granted in 
response to prayer, where it had not been granted to that point. 
25 e.g. De spiritu et littera XXX.52–5, esp. 52 and 54; Charles F. Urba and Joseph Zycha, eds, Sancti Avreli 
Avgvstini: De Peccatorvm meritis et remissione et de baptism parvvlorvm ad Marcellinvm libri tres, De spiritu 
et littera liber vnvs, De natura et gratia liber vnvs, De natvra et origine animae libri qvattvor, Contra dvas 
epistvlas pelagianorvm libri qvattvor, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesasticorum Latinorum 60 (Vienna and Leipzig 
1913), 208–12, at 208 and 212; Teske, tr., The Works of Saint Augustine I, 150–203, at 185–7, esp. 185 and 187: 
‘Liberum ergo arbitrium euacuamus per gratiam? absit, sed magis liberum arbitrium statuimus [...] cum potestas 
datur, non necessitas utique inponitur’ (= Are we then doing away with free choice through grace? Heaven 
forbid! Rather, we make free choice stronger [...] when power is given, necessity is not imposed). Bonner 
describes Jerome’s articulation of a similar view in On Jeremiah (In Hieremiam) IV.ii.5–7 as incoherent [pp. 
176–7].  
their freedom to fall in one way or another. It is in mistakenly concluding this to be the case 
that Bonner was left with little means of distinguishing between predestination and 
prevenient grace other than the basic contrast between prior preparation and subsequent 
enactment [pp. xii, 16].26  
     The apparent contradiction of divine providence and human freedom emerges from an 
anthropomorphic conception of God, in which God is imagined as standing at a point in time, 
looking forwards into every future moment and providentially controlling all subsequent 
outcomes.27 There can be no room for the meaningful deliberation of human reason in this 
perspective. The game is clearly rigged from the outset. However, if, as Augustine 
consistently claims, the eternity in which God abides is not an infinite duration of time, but an 
utter transcendence of time, which, as such, contains, in a simple changeless present, all that 
ever has or will emerge in the moment-by-moment of temporal process,28 then we are dealing 
with a rather different situation. In a providence of this sort, all the deliberations of human 
reason (in its freedom), and their results (in their contingency), will have been always already 
included, as they are in and to themselves, in its atemporal causing and ordering of all things. 
In this way, what is brought about necessarily, from the perspective of eternity, is, 
nevertheless, from the perspective of our temporality, truly brought about through the 
deliberation of human will. This is, at any rate, how Boethius and Eriugena solved the 
problem: Boethius in Books IV and V of his Consolation,29 and Eriugena, in his On Divine 
Predestination.30  
     If then, we follow Boethius and Eriugena in interpreting Augustine by means of 
Augustine, it requires that we regard his doctrine of grace as an attempt, not to orchestrate the 
complete victory of divine providence over human freedom, but (pace Bonner) to conciliate a 
strong doctrine of divine providence with a strong doctrine of human freedom, without 
compromising the strength of either in the process. From this perspective, the problem with 
Pelagius’ doctrine, as Bonner describes it, would not simply be that he fails to acknowledge 
the absolute dependence of human freedom on God’s grace for its potential to be successful 
in its innate aspiration toward what is good. Although this (and not Pelagius’ perceived 
demeanour) would certainly be the reason why Augustine accuses Pelagius of arrogance [cf. 
 
26 This interpretation is based on reading On the Perseverance of the Saints (De praedestinatione sanctorum) 
X.19 in isolation. However, in Augustine’s understanding, there seems to be only one important (but specific) 
instance, in which their distinction is, in the end, limited to this: the existential experience of the righteous 
person, that has, as such, insofar as they are righteous, freely chosen to submit their will to the same liberating 
activity of grace which made their will sufficiently free to be capable of choosing to submit itself to that grace in 
the first instance.  
27 My argument in this paragraph owes much to Robert Crouse’s magisterial essay, ‘Saint Augustine, Semi-
Pelagianism and the Consolation of Boethius’, Dionysius 22 (2004), 95-110, esp. 106–110. 
28 e.g. Augustine, Confessiones, I.vi.10, VII.xv.2, XI, esp. VII.xv.2; De civitate Dei XI.5–6, 21, XII.16–18; De 
Genesi contra Manichaeos, I.4; De Genesi ad litteram liber unus imperfectus, XIII; De Genesi ad litteram, 
VIII.20, 25–6. 
29 See especially, De consolatione Philosophiae V prosa 6, lines 30–31; Claudio Moreschini, ed., Anicius 
Manlius Severinus Boethius: De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula Theologica (München and Leipzig 2005, 
2nd ed.), 159.109–116; V.E. Watts, tr., Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy (London and New York 1969), 
167: ‘si quid providentia praesens videt, id esse necesse est, tametsi nullam naturae habeat necessitatem. Atqui 
deus ea futura, quae ex arbitrii libertate proveniunt, praesentia contuetur; haec igitur, ad intuitum relata divinum, 
necessaria fiunt per condicionem divinae notionis, per se vero considerata ab absoluta naturae suae libertate non 
desinunt’ (= if Providence sees something as present, it is necessary for it to happen, even though it has no 
necessity in its own nature. God sees those future events which happen of free will as present events; so that 
these things when considered with reference to God’s sight of them do happen necessarily as a result of the 
condition of divine knowledge; but when considered in themselves they do not lose the absolute freedom of 
their nature).  
30 i.e. De divina praedestinatione. 
pp. 23–4, 28, 78, 82, 105, 181, 306], as he does the pagan philosophers elsewhere.31 For 
Pelagius would also, in this view, appear to compromise divine providence for the sake of 
human freedom, by making it contingent on temporally foreknown human choices, a position 
that few Platonists, whether pagan, Jewish or Christian, could affirm.32 Such an inversion of 
the order of causality, in which divine activity is taken to respond to human activity, rather 
than human activity to divine activity, may well have been seen as an even more arrogant 
position to adopt than the former. Bonner is doubtless correct that political tensions between 
the episcopacy and unordained ascetics played a significant role in this debate, even if she 
overstates her point: Augustine being no stranger to the appeal of monastic asceticism 
himself,33 and even the author of a monastic rule.34 However, if she wants to reduce its 
significance to that of an anti-intellectual [pp. 205, 275, 303–5]35 shoring up of ecclesiastical 
authority [pp. 20, 268–9, 277, 286], she must first find a way of discounting the philosophical 
significance that Augustine’s doctrine of grace has for the larger Platonic tradition to which 
he belongs, a tradition which extends far beyond the bounds of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. 
Among his rough contemporaries, the closest analogy to Augustine’s solution to the problem 
of providence and human freedom is notably found, not in the works of a powerful fellow 
bishop, but in the works of Proclus, a Neoplatonic philosopher who was a member of the 
increasingly marginalised pagan minority.36 And then there is the matter of Boethius and 
Eriugena to deal with. It will be a difficult task to charge two speculative philosophers of 
such standing (unordained philosophers at that) with making an anti-intellectual appeal to 
clerical authority in their following of Augustine’s doctrine of grace, and to make the charges 
stick. 
     However, while this book has little to contribute to our understanding of the relationship 
between Pelagius and Augustine’s critique of him, it makes significant contributions in other 
ways. The principal achievement of this book is found in its second and third chapters, which 
cumulatively make up about half its length [pp. 29–110 and 111–96]. These chapters 
contextualise Pelagius’ theology in the larger developments of ascetic theology at the time, as 
found in St. Athanasius’ Life of St. Anthony, together its subsequent Latin mediations [pp. 
31–110], Apponius’ Commentary on the Song of Songs [pp. 192–4], Ambrosiaster’s 
Commentary on  the Pauline Epistles [pp. 184–92], and, perhaps most importantly, in the 
writings of St. Jerome [pp. 111–83]. It is all too easy when dealing with famous heretics to 
see them as miracles of evil or goodness that somehow ‘come out of nowhere’, so to speak. 
These chapters do much to show how someone like Pelagius could perceive what they were 
doing as a faithful interpretation of Catholic tradition, such as they understood it. Among the 
more important results of Bonner’s analysis is the conclusion that Pelagius had (or came to 
have, under the pressure of the controversies in which he found himself),37 a doctrine of grace 
which was not limited to the sense in which human nature may be said to be a divine gift, or 
even to the divine gift of the Mosaic law. Beyond these senses of grace, she demonstrates that 
 
31 For discussion and references, see John Marenbon, Pagans and Philosophers: The Problem of Paganism from 
Augustine to Leibniz (Princeton and Oxford 2015), 27, 30–33. 
32 i.e. since they would share standard doctrine that no superior cause can suffer the effects of a secondary cause. 
33 In Book VIII of his Confessions, Augustine describes the example of the Desert Fathers, and especially of St. 
Anthony the Great, as being instrumental to his conversion to Christianity. See Confessiones VIII.vi.15–29. 
34 i.e. De opera monachorum. 
35 esp. p. 205: ‘In reality it was not their intellect he objected to but their intellectual freedom’. 
36 See his De providentia. See also proposition 56 of his Elements of Theology; E.R. Dodds, ed. and tr., 
Elements of Theology (Oxford), ed. 54 and tr. 55: ‘Πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν 
προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ τὰ δεύτερα παρήγετο’ (= all that is produced by 
secondary beings is produced in a greater measure by prior and more determinative principles). 
37 Bonner presents this as a compromise with Augustine on the part of Pelagius, rather than a view he held 
initially [pp. 12–14, 18, 111]. 
Pelagius saw the Holy Spirit as cooperating with human effort, helping the soul in every 
situation, in accordance with its merits [pp. 14–18, 22, 29].38 This is a point well made. Yet 
this achievement is, as we have seen, somewhat diminished by her failure to recognise that 
Augustine also has a similar cooperative model himself,39 albeit one with a crucial difference: 
he insists that this process of cooperation, in which merit is significant, is wholly dependent 
on the prior unmerited working of prevenient grace in the soul for its operation.40 The other 
side of her missing this aspect of Augustine is that she does not consider that there may also 
be crucial differences between Pelagius’ cooperative model of grace, and those which she 
finds in Athanasius, Jerome and the rest.41 Once she identifies the presence of a cooperative 
model in one of these authors, it is then assumed to be more or less indistinguishable from 
that of Pelagius, and the analysis, for the most part, stops there [pp. 110, 181–2, 184, 192, 
194–6]. Thus, while this book is an important contribution to ongoing work to identify the 
‘lines of continuity’ between Pelagius and other early Christian writers, it is manifestly not, 
as Bonner has claimed, the ‘conclusion’ of this analysis [p. 306]. It is, however, a useful and 
engaging reference point for future work in this area, in spite of the systemic damage which it 
suffered at the hands of her unmeasured polemic against Augustine. 
     Likewise, there is much that is useful and interesting in Bonner’s description of the textual 
transmission of Pelagius’ works in the seventh chapter [pp. 288–301]. Her expertise with the 
relevant manuscripts is everywhere evident in this discussion. Yet her interpretation of 
Augustine leads her to unfounded conclusions about the significance of the evidence here as 
well. The mistaken conviction that any affirmation of free will is indistinguishable from 
Pelagius’ doctrine, and inherently opposed to Augustine’s, leads her, in turn, to the mistaken 
inference that the subsequent attribution of his works to Jerome or Augustine must then 
demonstrate the uncomplicated acceptance of his ideas, as he himself understood them. The 
widespread preservation of Pelagius’ texts under the names of authoritative authors certainly 
does reveal that they had an ongoing influence, of some sort, on Christian theology. But the 
meaning that a text might have for the medieval intellectual context which receives it cannot 
be assumed to be the same as our reconstruction of the meaning that it had for its late antique 
author, especially when that text had since come to be attributed to someone else. For her 
analysis of the character of this influence to be conclusive, she would have needed to 
consider how differently a given work of Pelagius would tend to have been understood, when 
interpreted in the light of the corpus (whether that of Jerome, or that of Augustine) in which it 
happened to have been falsely included. Even if Pelagius’ and Augustine’s respective views 
on free will were indeed as absolutely antithetical as Bonner claimed, it remains that a text 
which is attributed to Jerome, for instance, is unlikely to be interpreted in the same way as it 
would if it was attributed to a reputed adversary of Jerome [cf. pp. 295–7]. Although in this 
case, Bonner’s confidence that Augustine and Pelagius are binary opposites on the idea of 
free will, and that all affirmations of free will are equal, appears to have made such a crucial 
consideration seem unnecessary, with the unfortunate result that she concluded her analysis 
of Pelagius’ medieval influence before any conclusions could truly be reached. 
     There is, however, another aspect of this book, besides Bonner’s misunderstanding of 
Augustine, which systemically interferes with its central contribution, and that is her long 
 
38 As Augustine himself notes; On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin (De gratia Christi et de peccato 
originali) I.xxviii.29–xxx.31. Part of this passage is discussed by Bonner [p. 12].  
39 e.g. On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin (De gratia Christi et de peccato originali) I.vi.7, I.xix.20, 
I.xxxxiv.48, I.l.55. 
40 e.g. On the Predestination of the Saints (De praedestinatione sanctorum ) IX.17–X.19. For discussion and 
further references, see Marenbon, Pagans and Philosophers, 32–3. See also, On Grace and Free Will (De gratia 
et libero arbitrio) VI.13. 
41 For a recent essay which distinguishes Jerome’s thought on these matters both from Augustine, on one hand, 
and from Pelagius, on the other, see Dupont and Malavasi, ‘The Question of the Impact of Divine Grace’. 
digression on ‘interactionist theory’, as it is known to sociologists [pp. 265–80]. According to 
her account of the theory, what constitutes ‘evil’ or ‘deviance’ in a given context is wholly 
determined by what will best serve the aspirations of the powerful for the further 
consolidation and expansion of their power. The author takes this broadly Nietzschean (or 
Foucauldian) analysis to apply, without exception, to accusations of heresy as much as any 
other identification of evil. This is not especially surprising in itself. But given the 
implications of such a theory for any attempt at describing the world, it is rather surprising 
that its truth is assumed uncritically, as if it (and its interpreters) wholly transcended the 
power-struggle which it described. Insofar as it is true, there can be no such thing as truly 
‘disinterested analysis’, such as Bonner claims it provides [p. 267]. In the world it describes, 
there is only such meaning as the strong assign to the less strong. 
     Nevertheless, if this were the only principle at work in Bonner’s theology of history, we 
might have expected a fairly dispassionate description of the struggle between Augustine, 
Pelagius, and their respective allies, for the power to define the relationship between divine 
grace and human freedom, bearing in mind that all those involved (including Pelagius) had 
their own ideas of what doctrines were necessary to resist as heresies, and who their 
representatives were. There can be no heroes to praise or villains to blame in a world where 
the only losers are failed tyrants. Although, even then, this theory would introduce a 
significant tension to the book as a whole, seeing that, in idea, if not in sympathy, it would 
seem to take sides in spite of itself. For in theological terms, ‘interactionist theory’ is oddly 
reminiscent of a fairly radical interpretation of Augustine’s pessimism regarding the universal 
incapacity of human beings to attain to goodness on their own, apart from the foundational 
activity of prevenient grace first moving and instructing them from within. 
    What we are given, on the contrary, is a highly engaged defence of Pelagius against the 
purported machinations of Augustine and his allies. This is an exciting book. It has the air of 
courtroom drama, in which the expert defence-lawyer swiftly gathers masses of carefully 
ordered evidence which will, with a seeming excess of proof, exonerate the plaintiff of crimes 
which they did not commit, crimes of which their principal accuser is, in fact, guilty. Due to a 
number of factors, the chief of which is a fundamental mischaracterisation of Augustine’s 
position, we have seen that this apology, while accomplishing much that is worthy of further 
reflection and debate along the way, is rather less conclusive than it set out to be. However, 
this is not now our immediate concern.  
     The problem at issue here is that while an impassioned attempt to defend the just against 
the unjust, the sincere against the deceitful, sits very well with Bonner’s characterisation of 
Pelagius’ doctrine, given its emphasis on moral responsibility, it is not even intelligible in the 
world that her account of ‘interactionist theory’ describes, a world in which evil and good 
have no real existence, but are simply whatever it suits the powerful to say they are, for as 
long as it suits them to do so. Nor can such a theory support her historiography. It is not 
necessarily at variance, in principle, with an interpretation of history which finds in early 
modernity a return to the confidence, affirmative anthropology, and intellectual freedom that 
Bonner associates with the pre-Augustinian world. It is, however, in direct conflict with a 
portrayal of such a return as more positive than any other configuration which the powerful 
might determine for society. 
     And the mutual contradiction of these two rival anthropologies is joined by a third, which 
contradicts them both in turn. In her introductory and concluding arguments, Bonner does not 
present the affirmation of the efficacy of free will that she locates in Pelagius as preferable to 
the fatalism she finds in Augustine. Nor does she depict them as rival expressions of wholly 
arbitrary interactions of power. Rather, she describes them as irreconcilable ideas that are 
both, nevertheless, inherent to humanity itself [pp. xvii, 303]. Here the examples given are 
the 16th century debates between the Dominicans and Jesuits [pp. 300], and the authors of 
Classical Greece, namely Homer, Heraclitus, Euripides and Sophocles [p. 303]. Following 
her discussion of the 16th century evidence, she gives two potential reasons that such a debate 
is impossible to resolve: 1) that it is based on a false opposition of grace and free will, or 2) 
that it is based on ‘personal experience or priorities’ [p. 300].  
     Each of these possibilities acts as a way of conciliating this third claim, that the debate 
between divine providence and free will is essential to human existence, with one of the two 
rival anthropological claims discussed above. The second of these, the idea that the 
endlessness of the debate is due to its fundamental basis in the whim of personal preference, 
seems at least potentially commensurable with the idea that all human values are no more 
than expressions of power, even if the concept of a debate as somehow essential to humanity 
would appear to place a limit on the variety of these expressions. But the alternate possibility, 
that the endlessness of the debate is based on an objectively false opposition of grace and free 
will, undermines the very idea that power wholly determines value, and thus the validity of 
‘interactionist theory’ as a theory. Insofar as the endlessness of the debate may be due to a 
false opposition, one could seemingly bring it to an end were one to succeed in coming to a 
correct understanding of how grace and free will do not actually oppose each other. In this 
case, it would no longer be impossible to resolve. Real progress would, in principle, be 
attainable, and such progress would have the significance of helping humanity to be at rest 
with its own nature. This alternative seems somewhat more amenable to the main argument 
of the book, since Bonner is, in this argument, evidently attempting to arrive at definitive 
conclusions about the relationship between grace and free will that authentically belongs to 
early Christianity, and secondarily, the relationship that they truly have to each other in 
reality.  
     But then, we are offered yet another reason for the apparent impossibility of solving the 
debate between providence and freewill. The endlessness of the debate concerning them, we 
are told, is not due to a misunderstanding of their nature, but belongs to its very character as a 
debate, and is apparently something good in itself, that should not, as such, be limited in any 
respect. According to this understanding, the problem with Augustine is no longer his 
‘negative’ anthropological perspective, but his attempt to reduce the number of acceptable 
perspectives [pp. xvii, 27, 108, 214–7, 303–4]. Insofar as such endlessness is presented as 
something inherently good, this theory contradicts the idea that all notions of good and evil 
are strictly relative. Insofar as it is seen as essentially endless, it contradicts the idea that 
someone could, through careful work, actually come to a better and more definite 
understanding about the ideas being debated. Thus, the third reason Bonner gives for the 
debate’s longevity, with which she opens and closes her study, is perhaps the strangest of 
those which she adopts, given that it undermines both her appeal to ‘interactionist theory’ and 
the purpose of her argument as a whole, which, as a scholarly argument, seeks to advance our 
demonstrable knowledge of this debate, and not simply to add yet another voice to an 
inherently inconclusive, if expanding, ‘plurality of discourses’ concerning it [p.303]. 
     Bonner was right to be self-reflective about the theoretical foundation of her approach to 
interpreting Pelagius. There is a great deal of scholarly work which has the serious fault of 
not displaying adequate self-awareness on the part of the author about the theoretical basis of 
their own methodology. The attempt is to be applauded. However, this particular attempt is 
underdeveloped and deeply self-contradictory. As such, these aspects of the book 
unfortunately end up weakening the force of her main argument, and confusing its aims, 
rather than providing it with its appropriate theoretical foundations. The most promising 
among this array of perspectives is the idea that debate on the subject has been prolonged by 
a false opposition between grace and free will. Of all the possibilities she considers in the 
closing arguments, this is the one which best allows for the firm conclusions to which she 
aspired in her main argument, even if it is at wholly at odds with her digression on 
‘interactionist theory’. But were this to have been made the clear guiding principle of this 
study, at the expense of its rivals, Augustine would have been a more likely hero for her 
account than Pelagius. For we have seen that it is Augustine that contended that there is no 
opposition between grace and free will, something which allowed him to insist upon strong 
forms of both simultaneously. Whereas, while Pelagius, in Bonner’s interpretation, certainly 
has room for the continual help of grace, he resists a doctrine of grace as strong as 
Augustine’s, because it seems to him not to leave adequate room for free will. In broad terms, 
his theory, as interpreted in this book, is not then that there is a false opposition between 
them, but that too much of one will not leave room for the other. Thus, in the end, even this 
way of theorising the goal of Bonner’s study seems to sit uneasily with her principal 
argument. It becomes difficult to believe that the analysis does not, to some degree, serve a 
conclusion that has already been reached by other means, when that conclusion is presented 
as the result of so many mutually contradictory interpretations of the evidence.42 If 
Pelagianism is a myth, it remains to be seen. 
     It seems fair to say that The Myth of Pelagianism is an important book, and, as such, well 
worth criticising thoroughly. It is in that spirit that I have done so here. I am reminded of the 
old Neoplatonic maxim which says that ‘all things are in all things, but in each thing 
according to its proper nature’.43 Bonner clearly has the enviable scholarly gift of being able 
to discern the way that all things may be found (and may be said to be at stake) in the chosen 
object of study. The result is an unusually engaging argument which appears likely to attract 
a much broader and more varied readership than is typical for a scholarly book on late 
antique theology. Thus it seems well positioned to succeed (if any book is to succeed) in 
changing the character of the received assumptions that are broadly held concerning Pelagius. 
He was not against grace, but affirmed (or came to affirm) the moment-to-moment help that 
the soul received from the Holy Spirit, in accordance with its merits: in political terms, a 
Blairite rather than a Thatcherite, if you will.  
     This, in itself, would be a major achievement, even if similar arguments, with less popular 
effect, have previously been made. However, it is not, as a whole, a disciplined argument. 
Significant methodological oversights put the conclusiveness of her findings into question 
from the very outset. Her mischaracterisation of Augustine’s thought introduces systemic 
distortions throughout her interpretation of the evidence. The attempt to provide an account 
of the theoretical basis for her study undermines rather than strengthens its apologetic 
purpose. Thus its value to scholarship, while undeniable, is more in the parts than the whole, 
and more to experts, than to the broader audience to which it will likely appeal, since they 
will not have the same means of distinguishing between its illuminating moments, and those 
of the contrary tendency. It is hoped that this review may aid those who find themselves in 
the latter category in making good use of its significant, if complicated, contribution. The 
Myth of Pelagianism reveals a scholar whose future contributions to this field will be well 
worth anticipating. One would wish to hear more from her on the relationship of Pelagius to 
his predecessors, for example. But the question remains: will these future contributions 
likewise have the character of majestic ruins, having been dominated by the same polemicism 
that prevailed in and over this initial monograph, or will such titanic energies somehow be 
 
42 As in the famous joke of the ‘borrowed kettle’, where the mutually contradictory arguments by which the 
borrower seeks to prove that they did not break the kettle, cumulatively prove that they did indeed break it. 
Sigmund Freud speaks as if it preexisted him. However, it is his telling of it in The Interpretation of Dreams that 
is seminal for subsequent theorists; James Strachey, tr., Sigmund Freud. The Interpretation of Dreams: The 
Definitive Text (New York 1955), 143–4. 
43 Proclus, Elements of Theology, proposition 103; Dodds, ed. and tr., Elements of Theology, ed. 92 and tr. 93: 
‘Πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ’. Before Proclus, Syrianus attributed this broadly used saying to the 
Pythagoreans, and Iamblichus, to Numenius; see Dodds, Elements of Theology, 254. 
made to serve the nuances of argument, rather than overthrow them when and where they 
will? If such a sea change can be brought about, I expect that the result could not fail to be 
unambiguously praiseworthy. 
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